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SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
NASSAU COUNTY
Bursac v. Suozzi'
(decided October 21, 2008)
Alexandra Bursac "was arrested and charged" in Nassau
County with driving while intoxicated ("DWI") and with driving
while ability impaired by drugs ("DUI").2 Approximately one week
after her arrest, Bursac's name and picture were added to the Coun-
ty's drunk driving "Wall of Shame."3 Bursac claimed that the publi-
cation of her name and picture to the "Wall of Shame" violated her
right to due process under both the United States Constitution4 and
the New York Constitution.' The Nassau County Supreme Court
held that Bursac's due process rights were violated as the "publishing
and maintaining [of] the petitioner's name, picture and identifying in-
formation. . . on the County's ... website[] ... is sufficient to be the
plus in the stigma plus due process analysis."6
In May 2008 Nassau County Executive Thomas Suozzi and
Nassau County Police Commissioner Lawrence Mulvey implemented
the "Wall of Shame" program as a way to publicize the names of mo-
torists arrested for driving while intoxicated in Nassau County.! The
stated purpose of the creation of the "Wall of Shame" was to punish
those arrested for driving while intoxicated by "mak[ing] sure their
friends, neighbors and families know about it."8 As part of the pro-
gram the names and photographs of those arrested were published on
868 N.Y.S.2d 470 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2008)
2 Id. at 472.
Id. at 473.
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, states, in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . ."
5 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6, states, in pertinent part: "No person shall be deprived of life, li-
berty or property without due process of law."
6 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 481 (internal quotations omitted).
' Id. at 472.
8 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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the County Executive's website.9 In addition, Suozzi and Mulvey
announced the program through several press conferences with the
intention of encouraging media outlets to publish the "information to
insure that the shaming was public and widespread."o
On approximately June 10, 2008, Alexandra Bursac "was ar-
rested and charged" in Nassau County with DWI and DUI" in viola-
tion of sections 1192 (2)12 & 1192 (4)13 of the New York Vehicle and
Traffic Law ("VTL").14 Approximately one week following her ar-
rest, Bursac's name and photograph were published "on the coun-
ty['s] website" pursuant to its "Wall of Shame" program. 5 At the
time the photograph was published Bursac had not yet been convicted
on the DWI charge.16 Bursac requested by letter that the County Ex-
ecutive remove her information from the county's website.17 Follow-
ing the County Executive's refusal to remove her information, she
commenced a lawsuit alleging that the "Wall of Shame" program de-
prived her of her constitutionally protected right to "due process and
the equal protection of the law."' 8 More specifically, Bursac claimed
that the "Wall of Shame" program was unconstitutional as it denied
her the "presumption of innocence" and the right to "a hearing and
procedural due process."1 9
Before making a determination on Bursac's due process
claim, the court first examined whether the Article 78 proceeding 20
9 Id.
1o Id. (internal quotations omitted).
1 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
12 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (2) (McKinney 2009) provides, in pertinent part: "No
person shall operate a motor vehicle while such person has .08 of one per centum or more by
weight of alcohol in the person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's
blood, breath, urine or saliva . . . ."
13 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1192 (4) (McKinney 2009) provides: "No person shall oper-
ate a motor vehicle while the person's ability to operate such a motor vehicle is impaired by
the use of a drug as defined in this chapter." The court dismissed "the DUI drug charge ...
as the urine test for drugs was negative." Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
14 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 472.




19 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 473 (internal quotations omitted).
20 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (McKinney 2009) provides, in pertinent part:
Relief previously obtained by writs of certiorari to review, mandamus or
prohibition shall be obtained in a proceeding under this article. Wherever
[Vol. 26942
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she commenced was the proper procedure. 21 Article 78 of the New
York Civil Practice Law and Rules ("CPLR") provides a procedure
for "judicial review of administrative determinations involving the
exercise of discretion." 22 This mandamus to review is appropriate
when a determination is administrative and involves a judgment
made without a hearing.23 The appropriate standard of review in an
Article 78 proceeding "is whether the [administrative] determination
was arbitrary and capricious or affected by an error of law as opposed
to the substantial evidence standard required in certiorari proceed-
ings."24 The court determined that Bursac's commencement of an
Article 78 proceeding was an appropriate procedure by stating that
"[a] citizen must have an avenue to test the action of the C[ounty]
E[xecutive], which may have an impact on a constitutionally pro-
tected right."25 Since Bursac's claim was properly brought as an Ar-
ticle 78 proceeding, the court could examine her due process
claims.26
The Nassau County Supreme Court found that the publication
of names and pictures of arrestees on the "Wall of Shame" "is per-
missible under certain circumstances except when the circumstances
amount to stigma plus." 27  In making this determination the court
noted that publication on the "Wall of Shame" satisfies the stigma
component of the stigma plus test, but does not rise to the level of in-
fringing any constitutionally protected liberty or privacy interests. 28
Furthermore, any harms from the act of being on the list itself is
merely a "deleterious effect [flowing] directly from a sullied reputa-
tion.' "29
The trial court found that the problem with the Nassau County
"Wall of Shame" was not the list of arrestees in and of itself, but ra-
in any statute reference is made to a writ or order of certiorari, manda-
mus or prohibition, such reference shall, so far as applicable, be deemed
to refer to the proceeding authorized by this article.
21 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 474, 475.
22 Id. at 474 (internal quotations omitted).
23 id.
24 Id. at 474-75 (internal quotations omitted).
25 Id. at 475.
26 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 475.
27 Id. at 478 (internal quotations omitted).
28 id.
29 Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)(alteration in original) (quoting
Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1994)).
2010] 943
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ther the method in which the County Executive publicized the list."
The "scope and permanency of public disclosure on the Internet ...
distinguishes the County's 'Wall of Shame' from traditional and reg-
ular forms of reporting and publication such as print media."3 1 The
major flaw the court found in the "Wall of Shame" program was that
it was published in multiple places on the Internet where it could be
easily accessed, searched, and archived for viewing at any time and at
any location for an unspecified duration of time.32 It is this perma-
nence of publication that constitutes the plus in the analysis, and by
publishing the "Wall of Shame" in this manner the court found that
the County violated Bursac's due process rights.33
The United States Constitution and the New York Constitu-
tion afford protections to its citizens through their respective Due
Process Clauses. Both state that "no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law." 34 In analyzing Bur-
sac's due process claim the Nassau County Supreme Court applied
well-established federal precedent by noting that the United States
Supreme Court in Paul v. Davis35 held that "reputation alone does not
implicate any 'liberty' or 'property' interest sufficient to invoke the
procedural protection of the due process clause, and that something
more than simple defamation by the state official must be involved to
establish a constitutional claim."36 Paul dealt with the dissemination
of a flyer prepared by two Kentucky police departments.37 The pur-
pose of the flyer was to alert local merchants of individuals who had
been arrested in the area for shoplifting.38 Davis was included in the
flyer because of an arrest for shoplifting.39 At the time of the flyer's
publication Davis had not been adjudicated on the shoplifting
charge.40  After the flyer was distributed the charges were dis-
30 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
31 Id.
32 See id. at 479-80.
1 Id. at 478-79.
34 Id. at 476.
3s 424 U.S. 693 (1976)
36 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 476-77.
3 Paul, 424 U.S. at 694-95.
38Id.
3 Id. at 695.
40 Id. at 696.
[Vol. 26944
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missed.4 1 Davis' claim was that the inclusion of his name and picture
on the flyer deprived him of a liberty interest protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42
The stigma plus test is the standard for elevating a defamation
claim to a constitutional due process claim.43 In order "[t]o prevail
on a 'stigma plus' claim, a plaintiff must show (1) the utterance of a
statement 'sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation,...
and (2) a material state-imposed burden or state-imposed alteration of
the plaintiffs status or rights." 44 Such a burden or alteration must be
"in addition to the stigmatizing statement."45 The mere imposition of
a stigma by the government does not rise to the level of infringement
of a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest absent some
change in status suffered by the plaintiff.46 Such changes in status
necessary to satisfy the plus requirement include the deprivation of
property, termination of employment, and interference with busi-
ness.47 However, these changes must be a direct result of the defama-
tion: " '[D]eleterious effects [flowing] directly from a sullied reputa-
tion,' standing alone, do[es] not constitute a 'plus' under the 'stigma
plus' doctrine.' ,48
Justice Brennan dissented in Paul and noted that:
[Without] constitutional restraints on such oppressive
behavior, [like police officials labeling innocent indi-
viduals as criminals without trial,] the safeguards con-
stitutionally accorded an accused in a criminal trial are
rendered a sham, and no individual can feel secure that
he will not be arbitrarily singled out for . . . punish-
ment by those primarily charged with fair enforcement
41 id.
42 Paul, 424 U.S. at 696.
43 Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 477.
4 Sadallah, 383 F.3d at 38 (quoting Doe v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir.
2001)).
45 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original).
46 id.
47 Id. See also Patterson v. City of Utica, 370 F.3d 322, 330 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
termination of government employment satisfies the plus requirement); Greenwood v. New
York, 163 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 1998) ("[G]overnment defamation combined with the de-
privation of a property interest in clinical privileges g[ives] rise to a due process liberty in-
terest.").
48 Sadallah, 383 F.3d at 38 (alteration in original) (quoting Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d
992, 1001 (2d Cir. 1994)).
2010] 945
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of the law.49
In delivering the lead opinion in Paul Justice Rehnquist nar-
rowly interpreted Wisconsin v. Constantineau,5 0 a case which the
court of appeals relied on to find that Davis had a constitutionally
protected liberty interest in his own reputation. Constantineau dealt
with a Wisconsin statute5 2 that allowed certain officials to make a de-
termination to "forbid the sale or gift of intoxicating liquors to one
who by excessive drinking produces described conditions . . . , such
as exposing himself or family to want or becoming dangerous to the
peace of the community."5 3 Enforcement of this statute was carried
out via the posting of a notice containing the names of such individu-
als to whom the sale of alcoholic beverages was forbidden in stores
that sold alcohol.54 The determination and subsequent public posting
of the notice was done without a hearing or any process of review,
leaving the target of the ban without recourse once one of the many
statutorily authorized officials had made a determination that he
should be forbidden from obtaining alcohol.
The issue in Constantineau is not the content of the statute,
but rather the lack of procedural due process protections.56 The
"posting" of a person under the statute had the effect of "giving no-
tice to the public that . . . the particular [posted] individual's behavior
... fle]ll within one of the categories enumerated in the statutes.
In analyzing the issue the Supreme Court recognized that the district
court noted "[i]t would be na[Y]ve not to recognize that such posting
or characterization of an individual will expose him to public embar-
49 Paul, 424 U.S. at 714 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
50 (Constantineau Il), 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
s Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
52 The Wisconsin statute provided that town supervisors, mayors, chiefs of police, alder-
men, trustees, county superintendents, the chairman of the county board of supervisors, dis-
trict attorneys, and the spouse of the person accused under the statute, had the authority to
forbid the sale or gift of alcohol by personally serving the person against whom the ban was
levied and distributing in writing such a notice to stores and distributors of alcohol. Con-
stantineau, 400 U.S. at 434, n.2 (quoting Wis. STAT. § 176.26 (repealed 1971)).
53 Constantineau II, 400 U.S. at 434 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting WIS. STAT. §
176.26 (repealed 1971)).
54 Id. at 435.
s Id at 437.




Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/20
DUE PROCESS
rassment and ridicule."5 8 Moreover, the Supreme Court agreed with
the district court's determination that "procedural due process re-
quires that before [an individual,] acting pursuant to State statute[,]
can make such a quasi-judicial determination, the individual [bur-
dened by the action] must be given notice of the intent to post and an
opportunity to present his side of the matter." 59
In reaching its conclusion the Court reasoned that the impor-
tance of procedural protection is evident in the fact that "most of the
provisions of the Bill of Rights are procedural, for it is procedure that
marks much of the difference between rule by law and rule by flat." 60
In that vein the Court noted "where the State attaches 'a badge of in-
famy' to the citizen, due process comes into play." 61 Furthermore, an
individual's " 'right to be heard before being condemned to suffer
grievous loss of any kind, even though it may not involve the stigma
and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our so-
ciety.' "162
In Constantineau the United States Supreme Court held that
"[w]here a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him, notice and an
opportunity to be heard are essential." 63 This holding is not unique.
In Rosenblatt v. Baer64 Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, described
a person's right to protect his or her name as essential to our concept
of ordered liberty and stated that "[t]he protection of private personal-
ity, like the protection of life itself ... is entitled to [no] less recogni-
tion by this Court as [is] a basic [right] of our constitutional sys-
tem."65
Justice Rehnquist, however, interpreted the phrase "because
of what the government is doing to him" from the Constantineau
opinion to mean that "the governmental action taken in that case de-
5 Constantineau II, 400 U.S. at 436 (internal quotations omitted). See also Constantineua
v. Grager (Constantineau 1), 302 F. Supp. 861, 864 (1969) (finding section 176.26 unconsti-
tutional).
5 Constantineau H, 400 U.S. at 436 (quoting Constantineau 1, 302 F. Supp. at 864).
60 id.
61 Id. at 437 (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952)).
62 Id. (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
63 id.
6 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
65 Id. at 92 (Stewart, J., concurring).
2010] 947
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prived the individual of a right previously held under state law," and
that the state action of "[p]osting . .. significantly altered her status as
a matter of state law, and it was that alteration of legal status which,
combined with the injury resulting from the defamation, justified the
invocation of procedural safeguards."66 Accordingly, Justice Rehn-
quist continued, noting that, "[t]he stigma resulting from the defama-
tory character of the posting was doubtless an important factor . . . ,
but we do not think that such defamation, standing alone, deprived
Constantineau of any liberty protected by the procedural guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 67 Justice Rehnquist's interpretation
views the defamation as it occurred in both Constantineau and Paul
through the extremely narrow lens of whether the harm suffered by
the individual was significant enough to cause that person undue
harm. This interpretation is inappropriate as it neglects to recognize
the fact that the liberty interest at stake is not the right to be free from
governmental defamation, but instead the fundamental right to be free
from criminal penalties without due process.
The flaw in Justice Rehnquist's reasoning in Paul is apparent
when viewed in conjunction with the opinion in Constantineau. It is
not possible for Paul to be reconciled with Constantineau's holding
that it is necessary to provide the accused with notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard before levying punishment upon the accused.
These principles are not unique to Constantineau, but instead reflect
larger principles apparent in every instance of the American judicial
system. For example, the United States Supreme Court has recog-
nized that "one accused of a crime is entitled to have his guilt or in-
nocence determined solely on the basis of the evidence introduced at
trial ,68 and that "[t]he presumption of innocence is a doctrine that al-
locates the burden of proof in criminal trials; it also may serve as an
admonishment to the jury to judge an accused's guilt or innocence
solely on the evidence adduced at trial." 69 These well-established
principles are violated by the holding in Paul, which impermissibly
allows a member of the executive branch of government to levy pu-
nishments without a trial where guilt or innocence would be deter-
mined.
66 Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09 (internal quotations omitted).
67 Id. at 709 (internal quotations omitted).
68 Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978).
69 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533 (1979).
[Vol. 26948
8
Touro Law Review, Vol. 26 [2010], No. 3, Art. 20
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol26/iss3/20
DUE PROCESS
The New York Court of Appeals has also adopted the Paul
stigma plus test when analyzing the Due Process Clause of the New
York State Constitution.70 In Lee TT. v. Dowling, the New York
Court of Appeals dealt with individuals who wished to have their
names expunged from the state's central registry of child abusers. 7 '
The court began its analysis by stating that in both instances, whether
the federal and state "constitutional guarantee[s] [of due process]
appl[y] depends on whether the government's actions impair a pro-
tected liberty or property interest." 72 The court further stated that
"[t]here is no constitutional prohibition against the State maintaining
a list of suspected abusers."73 Citing Paul, the court adopted the
stigma plus standard, and determined that "[a] loss of liberty results
only if some more tangible interest is affected or a legal right is al-
tered." 74 Additionally, the court in Lee TT. found that inclusion of
the petitioners' names on the central registry constituted a significant
stigma, and that their subsequent change and loss of employment sa-
tisfied the plus requirement.
Furthermore, in People v. Letterlough76 the New York Court
of Appeals recognized that it is the exclusive domain of the "elected
Legislature" to determine what form of punishment to levy for specif-
ic crimes, and therefore a sentencing court is without authority to im-
pose other forms of punishment "not authorized by statute."7 7 Letter-
lough involved an individual who was convicted of driving while
intoxicated. As part of Letterlough's probation, the sentencing
court required him to affix a sign to any vehicle he operated that read
"CONVICTED DWI".79 The New York Court of Appeals held that
this form of shame punishment was impermissible for the sentencing
court to impose, because "the creation of punishment for crime rests
within the realm of the Legislature."8 0 The court also stated that the
70 Lee TT. v. Dowling, 664 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (N.Y. 1996).
" Id. at 1246.
72 Id. at 1249.
73 id.
74 Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09).
7 Lee TT., 664 N.E.2d at 1250.
76 665 N.E.2d 146 (N.Y. 1995).
n Id. at 150.
7 Id. at 147.
79 id
80 Id. at 150 (citing People v. Byrne, 570 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (N.Y. 1991)).
2010] 949
9
Saraga: Supreme Court of New York, Nassau County - Bursac v. Suozzi
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LAWREVIEW
judiciary "must act within the limits of their authority and cannot
overreach by using their probationary powers to accomplish what on-
ly the legislative branch can do."8 '
When compared to the holding in Letterlough it is clear that
the scheme in Bursac is impermissible, not only substantively but be-
cause of how it was created. Based on the Letterlough court's rea-
soning, it is not within the power of the court to impose novel pu-
nishments, nor is it within the power of the county executive to do so.
The Bursac case is a clear example where the Nassau County Execu-
tive-who lacks the power to do so-imposed a form of punishment
on individuals who have yet to be convicted. Moreover, the County
Executive lacks the power to impose the punishment on individuals
who have been convicted. Such a scheme that allows the county ex-
ecutive to create and administer punishment for crimes outside the
judicial process clearly violates New York constitutional principles.
While the Bursac court reached the correct outcome-that the
"Wall of Shame" containing pre-convicted arrestees is constitutional-
ly impermissible-it did so using fundamentally flawed reasoning.
The crux of the issue at hand is not merely one of defamation of a cit-
izen by a governmental agency, but the levying of a punishment for a
crime upon a citizen who has yet to be granted access to the constitu-
tionally guaranteed judicial system. Even more troubling about the
case at bar is that it is the county executive and police commissioner
who are imposing the sentence upon the arrestees, neither of whom
possess the official capacity to impose such punishment. By creating
the "Wall of Shame" the Nassau County Executive has rendered the
criminal process a sham by "convicting" people accused of a crime
without the proper procedural safeguards of a hearing.82
Furthermore, the comparison of Bursac to cases such as Paul
and Lee TT. is flawed. In Paul, the creation of the shoplifter list was
compiled and distributed in order to curtail the increase in shoplifting
activity.83 Moreover, the list in that case was never intended for
viewing by the general public. 84 Likewise, in Lee TT. the state cen-
tral registry of child abusers is a resource intended to regulate those
" Letteriough, 665 N.E.2d at 151.
82 See Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 470.
8 Paul, 424 U.S. at 694-95.
8 Id. at 695 (noting that distribution of the shoplifter list was limited to 800 local busi-
nesses as compared to the widespread Internet access of the "Wall of Shame" program).
[Vol. 26950
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who work with children by preventing known abusers from gaining
access to vulnerable children. Also, as in Paul, this list is generally
not open to public scrutiny.86 Unlike Paul and Lee TT., the list in-
volved in Bursac-the "Wall of Shame"-exists for no other reason
but to punish those who have been arrested for allegedly driving
while intoxicated in Nassau County. Additionally, this list is not only
intended for general viewing by the public, but it has been publicized
and promoted to increase the ease by which the public can view it.
The facts in Bursac are much closer to those in Constanti-
neau, and the analysis should have been the same in both of those
cases. Both Bursac and Constantineau dealt with a notification sys-
tem that placed a particular stigma on certain individuals without
providing them with any procedural safeguards or process. The Con-
stantineau court recognized that "[o]nly when the whole proceedings
leading to the pinning of an unsavory label on a person are aired can
oppressive results be prevented."87 This fact is completely over-
looked by Paul and its progeny. Both the statutory scheme in Con-
stantineau and Nassau County's "Wall of Shame" levy the equivalent
of a sentence in the form of an unsavory label, which could conceiv-
ably flow from a conviction in court. However, such "convictions"
flow not from the criminal process but from determinations made by
the executive branch of government. According to Justice Rehn-
quist's interpretation of Constantineau, the petitioners in both Bursac
and Constantineau sought to protect their liberty interest to be free
from excessive governmental defamation.88 However, this is flawed
because Bursac and Constantineau were not seeking to be free from
defamation, but rather to be free from convictions of crimes for
which they had not received due process.
According to the holding in Bursac, the "stigma-plus" stan-
dard in Paul would allow for such an executive conviction so long as
the amount of people who knew about it was limited. For example,
the Nassau County Supreme Court finds that the flaw in the "Wall of
Shame" is the fact that it is accessible via the Internet. Would the
ruling have been any different if the "Wall of Shame" was a physical
wall located in a public place somewhere in Nassau County? Under
8 Lee TT, 664 N.E.2d at 1247.
86 See id.
87 Constantineau II, 400 U.S. at 437.
8 See Paul, 424 U.S. at 708-09.
2010] 951
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the Paul stigma plus test the answer conceivably would be that such
an action would be permissible, which clearly exposes the problem
with the Paul standard.
The major problem with the "Wall of Shame" is its inclusion
of those who have yet to be convicted of the crime for which they are
being punished. The Nassau County Supreme Court uses this lan-
guage to dismiss Bursac's claim as an overly simplified lay notion of
the concept of the presumption of innocence. 89 However, the court
fails to realize that the true implication of this language is that it sup-
ports the notion that one has the right to stand trial and defend against
the allegations against them.90 By allowing the publication of the
"Wall of Shame" for no purpose'other than its stated goal of embar-
rassing and punishing those arrested-not convicted-of drunk driv-
ing, the government strips individuals of their right to have their guilt
or innocence determined at trial. In addition, the "Wall of Shame"
program has the effect of shifting the burden of proof from the prose-
cution, to prove the guilt of the accused, over to the defendant, to
prove his innocence.
The importance of a person's reputation in the American legal
system is apparent in the lengths the system goes to ensure that a per-
son is not wrongly deprived of his good name. According to Justice
Brennan, this is the purpose for the "concrete protection through the
presumption of innocence and the prohibition of state-imposed pu-
nishment unless the State can demonstrate beyond a reasonable
doubt, at a public trial with the attendant constitutional safeguards,
that a particular individual has engaged in proscribed criminal con-
duct."91 In the instant case, the publishing of Bursac's name and pic-
ture completely circumvents the system's constitutional safeguards
without so much as a cursory look as to whether the person has ac-
tually committed a crime. It also places upon the accused-in the
eye of the general public-the stigma of being convicted of a crime
for which he has not yet stood trial. It is this stigma, in and of itself,
which is constitutionally impermissible, and the very reason the legal
system requires criminal convictions be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt.92
89 See Bursac, 868 N.Y.S.2d at 480.
90 Taylor, 436 U.S. at 485.
91 Paul, 424 U.S. at 724 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 724-25.
952 [Vol. 26
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The Court in Paul rejects the notion of the importance of a
person's reputation due to questionable reasoning compared to
precedent at the time the decision was handed down. However, Paul
and its progeny have become the leading authority in this field and
the United States Supreme Court continues to find that damage done
to a person's reputation alone does not constitute a violation of a con-
stitutionally protected liberty interest. This reasoning must be
changed because of the advent of technology, which is clearly evi-
denced by the facts presented in Bursac. In light of the Bursac deci-
sion, a person's reputation and her interest in keeping that reputation
free of unwarranted blemishes is more important than ever before.
This struggle to reconcile the stigma plus standard with the
increase in the availability of information is seen in Bursac. At the
time the United States Supreme Court handed down its decision in
Paul, inclusion in a flyer distributed to local merchants may in fact
have stigmatized the included individuals but could have fallen short
of the actual damages necessary to satisfy the plus requirement. As
seen in Bursac, the dissemination of a similar list published on the In-
ternet nearly automatically satisfies the plus requirement due to the
nature of the publication. As such, it is apparent that the stigma plus
test is no longer an appropriate measure of governmental defamation.
In Bursac the Nassau County Supreme Court, in applying
Paul, found the County Executive to have the power to levy punish-
ments outside of the constitutionally mandated trial process. This ac-
tion by the County Executive clearly violates the procedural due
process of those who are subject to such punishments. While the
court ultimately determined that the County Executive cannot publish
the information on the Internet, it is the courts' ratification of his un-
constitutional actions which sets a frightening precedent for allowing
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